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Classifying for Diversity 
Abstract 
This paper argues that a new approach to classification best supports and celebrates social diversity. It 
maintains that we should want a classification that both facilitates within-group communication and cross-
group communication. This is best accomplished through a truly universal classification that classifies works 
in terms of authorial perspective. Strategies for classifying perspective are discussed. The paper then 
addresses issues of classification structure. It follows a feminist approach to classification, and shows how a 
web-of-relations approach can be instantiated in a classification. Finally the paper turns to classificatory 
process. The key argument here is that much (perhaps all) of the concern regarding the possibility that classes 
can be subdivided into subclasses in multiple ways (each favored by different groups or individuals) simply 
vanishes within a web-of-relations approach. The reason is that most of these supposed ways of subdividing a 
class are in fact ways of subdividing different relationships among classes. 
Introduction 
Classification necessarily involves structure, and thus there is a perhaps inevitable 
tension between classification and the celebration1 of diversity.  Since not all societal 
groups – gender, ethnic, or socio-economic – have been equally represented in the 
development of major classifications, a related concern arises that existing 
classifications privilege certain ways of looking at the world while obscuring others. 
Can we develop a universal classification that reflects and celebrates diversity?  
This question is rarely asked explicitly, despite its obvious importance. It would be 
unfortunate to assume a needlessly pessimistic answer to this question.  It could be that 
some of the advocacy of the exclusive performance of domain analysis in the literature 
reflects an unstated view that each societal group is best served by its own 
classification.2 
 This paper will first explore the purpose of classification from the perspective of 
diversity: what exactly should we want a classification to do in order to respect and 
support diversity? Once we have set goals for classification, we can then proceed to 
examine questions of structure: how should a classification be organized in order to 
achieve these goals? Finally we can turn to process: Is it feasible to develop such a 
classification? 
Purpose  
How can library classification best serve the interests of diverse groups? The first 
question that might be asked is whether we wish to encourage cross-group 
understanding, or is within-group understanding of paramount importance?  If it was 
thought that each societal group should have unique and privileged access to its own 
literature, then domain analysis would be the obvious way to go. Each group could 
classify its own literature in terms of concepts with which non-group members would 
1  In a salute to ambiguity I appreciate that this is not quite the right word. I mean by it to recognize, 
appreciate, and support diversity to an appropriate degree. 
2  As I noted in Szostak (2013c), an argument that domain analysis is all that we can do should be carefully 
distinguished from an argument that it is all that we should want. They are each misguided for quite 
different reasons. I was inspired there and in this paper by Fox (2012). 
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be unfamiliar – or better yet apply unique meanings to terms which others might 
mistakenly believe to be familiar. Outsiders would then find it extremely difficult to 
access the literature.  Only those within the group, and possessing a clear apprehension 
of the true meaning of the concepts employed in the classification (grounded in turn in 
how the concepts are employed in the group’s literature) would be able to readily 
navigate the literature.  Classification would support group solidarity. 
The cost would be in terms of cross-group understanding. Group members would 
have to master other classifications if they wished to read in the literatures generated by 
other groups.  And they would have to publish in venues classified in other ways if they 
wished to speak beyond their group. Information scientists could generate translation 
devices, perhaps, but even these would be costly to master for each group one wished 
to engage. 
Cross-group understanding would be best facilitated by a universal classification. 
Then members of any group would have equal access to all literatures.  The cost – we 
are leaving aside issues of practicality for the moment – would be that group members 
would lack any special access to the literature of their own group: works authored by 
group members might be hard to distinguish from works on similar topics by others.  
Especially if the group were small they might legitimately feel that a universal 
classification militates against a sense of common cause and identity. 
The challenge for information science is that the answer to our opening question in 
this section is almost certainly “Both.” Only the most xenophobic would wish to cut 
their group off completely from interaction with others (especially as individuals in the 
contemporary world increasingly have several cross-cutting group memberships). And 
even the most universalist in outlook can appreciate the value of people being able to 
readily communicate to others with certain shared characteristics. 
The lesson for information science is clear but rarely stated: we should strive to 
facilitate both across-group and within-group communication.  And this result holds for 
any type of group: disciplinary, gender, ethnic, occupational/class, religious, sexual 
orientation, and so on. 
Is it possible to pursue both goals simultaneously? I have argued elsewhere (Szostak 
2010) that domain analysis and the pursuit of a truly universal classification can be 
complementary approaches.  The key argument is that complex concepts – those that 
are understood differently across groups – can be broken into basic concepts (this is 
where domain analysis can be employed) that lend themselves to broadly similar 
understandings across groups (Szostak 2011).  Basic concepts generally refer either to 
the things we study (including theories and methods) or relationships among these. 
Works and ideas are then classified in terms of combinations of these basic concepts.  
Notably, a classification grounded in such basic concepts will not only aid users in 
finding works written by members of any group but will aid them in understanding 
those works (by translating complex concepts into basic concepts) (Szostak 2013a). 
But these arguments – though showing that domain analysis is far from incompatible 
with universal classification, and that a classification can support cross-group 
understanding – do not on their own provide an answer to our present question.  There 
is a piece missing: can we signal within such a universal classification the group 
membership of authors? 
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This question in turn raises both philosophical and practical questions. 
Philosophically, authors may often not wish to be seen as speaking as a member of a 
particular group.3  And so we need to appreciate that attempts to classify works in 
terms of group membership have a potential downside.  Authors may be striving to 
generate universal understanding. More pragmatically they may worry that group 
identification will blunt their ability to reach out to others.  Allowing authors 
themselves to decide whether their works should be given any particular group 
identification provides an imperfect solution (and only for the living). 
On the practical level, it would seem that the classificationist needs to develop a list 
of group descriptors.  But perhaps not: if the classification relies on combinations of 
basic concepts, then every possible group will already of necessity be classified in 
order to describe works about that group. Group membership could then be signaled by 
linking “from the perspective of” and a particular group. 
There may, though, be an even better way to proceed. Many scholars  have argued 
that (at least some) works should ideally be classified in terms of authorial perspective.4  
None that I am aware of have suggested a detailed classification of perspectives. Yet 
one clear implication of this literature is that group membership will often not be the 
best signal of perspective.  Describing a work as ‘gender studies,’ or alternatively as 
applying ‘feminist theory,’ will send a more valuable signal than merely noting the 
gender of the author.   
I have long urged the classification of works in terms of theories – and methods – 
applied, and this was a key component of the León Manifesto (2007).  I confess that I 
have only belatedly emphasized classification in terms of discipline or interdisciplinary 
field of author.  And I now appreciate that it is important to embrace a much wider set 
of perspectives. 
A variety of dimensions might be useful in capturing the perspective of an author: 
inter/disciplinary; theoretical, methodological, rhetorical,5 epistemological, ideological, 
aesthetic, ethical.6 More broadly we wish with authorial perspective to capture key 
motives and beliefs of the author. A key challenge for the information scientist is that 
there are imperfect correlations across these dimensions: not all who apply feminist 
theory are female, and feminist theory is applied outside of gender studies. A work 
classified along only one dimension will be missed by users searching along another. 
In sum it is likely possible to enhance both across-group and within-group 
communication through a universal classification that classifies works in terms of 
authorial perspective. But our ability to achieve both depends on our developing a 
useful classification of authorial perspective. 
                                                          
3  We can set aside for the moment a concern voiced by some scholars that the pretence of a universalist 
perspective is itself a marker of male dominance: the principle of literary warrant would still guide us to 
recognize such an aspiration. 
4  Otlet, Mills, and Vickery are among those who have over the years urged classification of works in terms 
of perspective. 
5  Feinberg (2011) speaks in particular of logical argument (manipulation of evidence), ethos (incorporation 
of audience beliefs and values to establish trust), genre adaptation (adjustment of formal elements). Her 
purpose is to argue for an explicit authorial voice in classifications, but her argument can be used for 
classifying works by authorial voice.   
6   Clavier and Paganelli (2012) argue that we should classify works by stance: criticism, agreement, 
consensus, etc. 
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As a segue to our next section, it is useful to engage with arguments made by Mai 
(2011). He argues that contemporary approaches to classification (grounded in 
ontology) reflect a modernist view that imagines in a realist fashion that the things we 
study exist separately from those who study them. He instead recommends an 
epistemological approach to classification that appreciates subjectivity. Though I am 
epistemologically more confident than Mai that consensus is possible due to our ability 
to fairly accurately apprehend reality, I can nevertheless appreciate that Mai provides a 
further justification for classifying works by perspective: this will help to identify the 
biases that an author brings to the work.7  But Mai is not sure what a classification 
grounded in subjectivity would look like (nor is Hjørland 2012). He might thus be 
skeptical of our ability to classify perspectives in a way that respects all perspectives. 
More generally, Mai doubts that there can be consensus on the classes within any 
classification. Though I am again much more optimistic than Mai, it will prove useful 
to try to meet this concern as much as possible.  That is, if different people or groups 
will (even just sometimes) disagree over the nature of classes, then we should strive to 
minimize the scope for disagreement. This we will do in each of the next two sections 
by simply limiting the degree of hierarchical organization, and focusing on the 
classification of basic concepts. Mai also urges transparency: it should be clear how a 
classification was developed (so that the user can evaluate whether/what biases drove 
its development). This principle will also guide us.    
 
Structure   
We have identified above some characteristics to be sought in a classification.  But 
what sort of structure will best achieve these goals? We start this section by responding 
to a feminist critique of classificatory practice, and then show that – not surprisingly – 
the classification that responds to this critique serves the various goals outlined above. 
Olson (2007) has suggested that hierarchy is more reflective of a ‘masculine’ 
perspective, and that a classification that blended hierarchy with a ‘web of relations’ 
approach would be more gender-neutral.  Women, she argues, are more likely to see 
the world in terms of a web of relations. But Olson also argues that underprivileged 
social groups would likely also benefit from a less hierarchical approach to 
classification.  
Is such a classification possible?  This critical question has not been addressed in 
the detail that it deserves.  It will be argued that such a classification is indeed possible, 
with reference being made to the Basic Concepts Classification that I have been 
developing (and was briefly outlined above; see Szostak 2013b). The key again lies in 
classifying works in terms of combinations of basic concepts.  One work might be 
classified in terms of how a phenomenon A influences a phenomenon B in a particular 
manner Z.  Such a work will be found easily by anyone interested in how A might 
affect B in manner Z, regardless of the user’s group membership.  It can also be found 
easily by anyone studying how B influences C who then becomes curious about how to 
                                                          
7   But it will not capture all sorts of bias. In Szostak (2004, ch.5) I attempted a classification of the various 
sorts of bias that affect scholars. In addition to those sorts of bias grounded in socio-cultural 
understandings are biases reflective of human cognitive and perceptual limitations, biases rooted in the 
need to participate in an ongoing conversation, biases reflective of the incentives authors face, and biases 
reflecting institutional structures. 
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encourage changes in B.  And someone interested in how F influences G in manner Z 
might become interested in other cases of influence of type Z.  So this sort of 
compound classification utilizing basic concepts in fact instantiates a web of 
relationships at the level both of works and of the key arguments expressed in works. A 
user can thus follow, if they wish, a complex set of issues from one work to another.  
As Olson notes, present classifications facilitate browsing only within a hierarchy; the 
proposed structure also facilitates browsing across hierarchies. 
Hierarchy is still necessary in such a classification, but to a much lesser extent. 
Types of influence can be captured through combinations of some 100 basic types of 
influence that can be organized in just two levels of hierarchy (occasionally three; see 
Szostak 2012). The things we perceive can, at least in the human sciences, be captured 
in very compact schedules (Szostak 2011, 2013b). Natural science requires much more 
detailed hierarchies of species and chemical compounds. 
Olson is concerned that hierarchical approaches tend to privilege “being a Y” over 
“not being a Y” in general, and “being male” over “not being male” in particular. A 
classification that did not distinguish males from females in any class except gender 
itself could obviate this concern. In place of present practice, in which male nurses and 
female engineers are treated as some sort of anomaly, the classification here would use 
linked notation: (nurse)(male) and (nurse)(female) would be classificatorily equivalent 
– as indeed would be (nurse)(transgendered).
Olson worries that hierarchy privileges deduction over induction. I have long 
argued that the best approach to classification blends induction and deduction. And 
indeed this is one key reason for urging us to blend universal and domain-analytical 
approaches (see Szostak 2010), for a universal classification demands some logical 
structure whereas domain analysis is inherently inductive. I urge a deductive approach 
to hierarchy below. Allowing elements in any hierarchy to be freely linked with 
elements in any other hierarchy provides immense scope for an inductive appreciation 
of any connection drawn in any literature (as long as any thing or relationship 
discovered in the literature is represented in some hierarchy) (Szostak 2013b). 
Olson also worries that the logical philosophy that underpins hierarchy privileges 
reason over emotion and intuition, and assumes away bias. I concur that emotion and 
intuition are important parts of the process of discovery (Szostak 2002), and have 
attempted to classify the types of bias that characterize scholarship (Szostak 2004, 
chapter 5).  Classifying works in terms of authorial perspective will, as noted above, 
provide some insight into potential biases; it may also tell us something about the 
particular role of emotion and intuition in a work. Allowing free combination will – as 
in the nurse example above – provide a powerful antidote to bias. And it will be argued 
in the next section that an emphasis on combinations reduces and may even eliminate 
the biases that creep into hierarchies themselves. 
Though Olson did not describe in detail what her recommended classification 
would look like, she did appreciate that it would rely heavily on a synthetic approach. 
She noted that even when a synthetic approach is pursued within contemporary 
classifications some combinations are privileged over others. It is thus critical that it be 
possible to freely combine any set of concepts. 
Of particular note, Olson appreciates that existing classifications handle 
paradigmatic relationships best. Yet since paradigmatic relationships are enduring we 
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rarely need state the obvious. It is syntagmatic relationships (where the connection is 
not essential, as in embroidery of Christmas ornaments) which we will often wish to 
express [search for] but these are handled poorly. Boolean searches will yield many 
hits that do not capture the desired relationship. Again, the solution involves allowing 
us to freely connect any set of concepts both in classifying a work and in searching.  
The sort of classification outlined here, which addresses each of the concerns raised 
by Olson, not surprisingly serves also the goals identified in the first section. It is 
universal. It facilitates cross-group exploration and understanding, by relying on 
combinations of basic concepts that are broadly understood in similar ways across 
groups.  It is amenable to classification by authorial perspective (or group membership) 
because it allows any concepts to be combined.   
Olson is critical not just of classification but of standard practice in constructing 
thesauri. Hierarchical relationships are captured fairly precisely by the terminology of 
BT (broader term) and NT (narrower term). But a host of different relationships are 
lumped together as RT (related term).  Our thesauri are thus as guilty of privileging 
hierarchy as our classification systems. But this need not be: we could aspire to 
recognizing several key types of relationship. We might in particular designate the 
basic concepts that combine to generate a more complex concept.   
Olson notes that the thesaurus construction standard, ANSI/NISO Z39.19, provides 
for a limited set of allowed RT relationships: process/agent, process/counteragent, 
action/property, action/product, action/target, cause/effect, concept or object/property, 
concept or object/origins, concept or object/measurements, raw material/product, and 
discipline or field/object or practitioner; and also antonyms (plus a few arcane 
exceptions) The standard allows these to be explicitly indicated on a local basis. But 
why not insist that these and others are always designated?8 
While celebrating diversity is an important (albeit under-studied) desideratum of a 
classification scheme, it is not the only desideratum. It is thus worth noting that the sort 
of classification (and thesaurus) urged here has many advantages beyond achieving the 
goals of the first section and responding to the concerns outlined by Olson. I have 
argued (2011) that breaking complex concepts into basic concepts is the ambiguity-
minimizing strategy in classification.9 Several other advantages can be briefly noted 
(see Szostak 2013b): 
1. Since most works can be classified as links between phenomena, we are able
to achieve very precise classifications with limited and expressive notation.
2. Users are thus better able to find precisely what they want, whether they wish
to search in one discipline or across all.
3. By distinguishing different sorts of relationship (especially
causation/influence), we enable searches by verb-like terms as well.10
8  Olson later suggests that chronological would be one useful addition. Khoo and fin-Cheon 2006 predict 
that relationships will be of increasing importance in information science. They suggest yet other useful 
types of relationship that could be indicated including troponymy, intentionality, necessity, conjunction, 
and disjunction. 
9  Such a classification may also serve as a bridge between other classifications. Yi and Chan (2010) explore 
the possibility of rendering LCSH interoperable with other systems. They criticize LCSH both for 
inconsistent application of hierarchy and for unclear semantics and syntax.  
10 Friedman and Smiraglia (2013) find that most concept maps employed in knowledge organization have 
nouns as nodes and verbs as arcs. But our classifications do not reflect this synergy. 
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4. While other classification systems provide specific instructions in multiple 
places for coding by time or place or people, this system has a universal 
coding for such elements. This renders both classification and searching easier. 
5. Note that the use of linked notation serves to place works [but not individual 
concepts] within multiple hierarchies (and of relations as well as things)  
6. It should be possible to translate all search or entry terms employed in other 
classifications into basic concepts. The system may provide a solution to the 
fact that online databases employ a bewildering array of classification systems. 
7. Note that in addition we create the possibility of (fairly) automatically coding 
for new works or for existing works that are at present poorly classified.  
 
Lambe (2007) also appreciates that hierarchy is not the only way to classify (he 
mentions matrices,11.system maps, and facets), and is often not the best. He appreciates 
that our goal is to show how things are related. He suggests that users by looking at a 
taxonomy should gain a sense of how things connect. Taxonomies should also serve as 
artificial memory aids: helping us to remember things by relating them to others. It 
deserves to be stressed that a classification that relies on combinations across a very 
manageable set of schedules is both much easier to master and to understand. Most 
users approach subject headings within existing classification systems with no 
understanding of how these are generated or related to each other. The suggested 
classification is transparent. 
Lambe addresses in detail the fact that many concepts appear within multiple 
hierarchies in existing classifications.  He is very critical of this practice, arguing that a 
hierarchical approach becomes too complicated if concepts appear in many places (see 
also Soergel 1985, 254-6). It is thus better to capture this sort of situation in other ways 
than through hierarchy. This is precisely what we have done. And thus our approach 
serves diversity and also generates a less problematic classification. 
It could also be that the approach urged here will close the gap between the fields of 
classification and information retrieval. Scholars of information retrieval increasingly 
disdain the ‘bag of words’ assumption driving many search techniques: that the 
concepts being searched for occur independently. They appreciate that users search for 
combinations of concepts (e.g. Mengle and Goharian 2010, Khoo and fin-Cheon 2006).  
Though search engines generally ignore existing classification systems, they might find 
a classification which stresses such combinations useful.12  
  Last but not least, Borner (2006) suggests that in the near future scholars might just 
add ‘nuggets’ or ‘nodes’ to the web of knowledge. That is, the present practice of 
writing stand-alone papers will be replaced by a practice of adding insights to a pre-
existing structure. She reviews various efforts over the last century to develop links 
                                                          
11  I developed a five-dimensional typology of theory types in Szostak (2004). This is employed in the Basic 
Concepts Classification and the Integrative Levels Classification in order to allow us to capture the type of 
theory employed in a work. See Gnoli and Szostak (2008).  
12  Birger Hjørland and I have often disagreed in the past (see Fox 2012, Szostak 2013c). But in speculating 
on the role of classification “after Google” he says much that is consonant with the approach 
recommended here: that information scientists should work on an overall structure that somehow connects 
domain analyses, that the key is the semantic relations between concepts (though he at times stresses 
hierarchy), and that documents should be classified not in terms of simple aboutness but rather what a 
reader would find useful/novel in them. 
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between related bits of information (such as citation indices). New technology creates 
an opportunity to finally achieve this goal. But search engines are like inserting a 
needle in a haystack, and usually do not place search results in context:  they “fail to 
equip scholars with a birds-eye view of the global structure and dynamics of scholarly 
knowledge and expertise” (186).  The sort of classification here can be used both to 
classify works and ideas (a desiderata noted by Gnoli 2008).  It would thus be 
congenial to the sort of shift foreseen by Borner, such that any author’s ideas can 
readily be related to the ideas of other authors. But the structure’s fluidity would mean 
that classification itself does not privilege certain ideas over others. 
Process    
The system as outlined above allows the free combination of concepts across any 
hierarchies (of both things and relationships).  How, though, are these hierarchies 
developed? 
Olson has also often used a ‘slicing pizza’ analogy.13  We can subdivide classes into 
subclasses in multiple ways. Different groups may wish to slice their pizza in different 
ways.  This conundrum seems insoluble. Any use of hierarchy in classification must of 
necessity privilege one way of slicing the pizza.14 
But it is in fact quite straightforward to address this problem within the sort of 
classification urged here: most if not all possible approaches to slicing any pizza can in 
practice be addressed simultaneously within a ‘web of relations’ approach. As noted 
above, the web approach significantly lessens the need for hierarchy. In particular, it 
eliminates the oft-noted practice (e.g. by Mazzocchi et al 2007), common in all major 
classifications, of abusing hierarchy such that causal arguments (or other sorts of 
relationship between phenomena)  are treated as if they were a proper subset of some 
phenomenon.   
More centrally, when hierarchy is employed in the type of classification 
recommended here, it is usually subdivision in terms of ‘type of’ (but occasionally 
‘parts of’) that is called for. And ‘type of’ is best defined functionally for social 
phenomena (so that institutions, for example, are classified in terms of their official 
purpose) and in terms of their essence for natural objects (so that species are organized 
in terms of genetic inheritance, and chemical compounds in terms of constituent 
chemicals).   
Yet surely this privileges this one slicing strategy? How do we decide that this is the 
best way to subdivide? While there are other reasons, the one to stress here is that 
most/all other ways of slicing the pizza can be easily captured through combinations. It 
has often been noted, for example, that pharmacologists might want to classify drugs in 
terms of physiological effect, while chemists will want to classify them by chemical 
composition. The former can easily be rendered as, say (drugs)(reduce)(blood pressure).  
The latter can only be captured through a ‘type of’ approach.  In other words, the 
classification wished for by pharmacologists is a classification of relationships, 
whereas the classification sought by chemists is a classification of subsidiary types of 
real things.  
13 And Olson (2007) appreciates that multiple BT are common in thesauri. 
14  Hjørland (2012) notes there are no good guidelines on how to pursue an interpretivist approach to 
classification, once one denies there is one best way to subdivide. 
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The claim here is strong: that there often (always?) is one right way to slice the 
pizza. We have imagined or at least exaggerated the challenge of slicing because we 
have abused hierarchy in order to capture relationships. Once we handle relationships 
as relationships, the slicing conundrum is alleviated and may even disappear.  We must 
always be careful of reaching empirical conclusions on the basis of theoretical 
arguments alone. The arguments made here must be tested in practice. My own efforts 
to develop the Basic Concepts Classification suggest that we only rarely confront 
choices about how to slice (see Szostak 2013b). But this conclusion needs to be 
verified by others who may bring different slicing preferences to the task.  What is 
clear on theoretical grounds is that we can substantially reduce our slicing choices by 
treating relationships as relationships. 
Mai (2010) argues that information science has long but mistakenly assumed that 
we were searching for the one best classification, and that general rules and 
commonalities existed that needed to be identified. As noted above, he argues that bias 
is inevitable. But it is useful to explore here the precise arguments he makes with 
respect to what we have termed “slicing the pizza.” First, he notes that likeness is not a 
quality of things but a relationship between them; we can find some similarity between 
any two things (e.g. plum and lawnmower). But what sorts of similarities exist between 
a plum and a lawnmower? Perhaps color, perhaps uses to which they can be put, 
perhaps places they are stored. All of these can be captured through relationships.15 The 
only singular class of which they are “types of” is “things.” Again, we need to be 
careful of leaping to an empirical conclusion, but it must seem that many/most/all types 
of likeness can be handled through a web of relationships approach. And indeed Mai’s 
own words – that likeness is a quality of relationships – suggest that this is so. 
Mai then argues, following Hjørland, that a stone in a field has information of 
different types for different users and thus we cannot hope to classify all of these; no 
one mapping is the true mapping.  But we can clearly use relationships to capture (at 
least) many of these for they reflect different uses to which the stone can be put: 
mining, building, skipping, and so on. It is noteworthy that the word “mapping” is used 
here in the sense of one-to-one mapping when the solution is a map that shows all 
relationships and thus allows one concept to be mapped to many.   
Finally, what about an area where there is intense scholarly controversy, such as in 
defining types of mental illness? Psychologists disagree about how this is best done 
(see Cooper 2011). Even here a web of relations approach has much merit. Some 
psychologists would classify in terms of physiological symptoms and others 
psychological symptoms. Some would look for common causes, others for common 
effects. Rather than choosing one way of classifying mental illness, it would be better 
to employ relationships to capture all.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Though the three issues of purpose, structure, and process were addressed separately, 
the analyses are complementary: there is one approach to classification that addresses 
all three. It is thus possible to develop a classification that celebrates and supports 
diversity. Happily, that approach also has many other positive attributes. 
                                                          
15 Mai (2011) argues that the concept ‘cow’ can be classified as a food, an animal, and so on. But this is a 
good example of how we can use relationships to capture its use as a food: animals that can be eaten. 
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